



The Existence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Da'wah after Dissolution

Sabiruddin¹, Muhammad Fikri Taqiyuddin², Muhammad Ridwan¹, Sarwan¹, Puja Dikusuma Mardiana³

¹Department of Islamic Community Development Faculty of Da'wah and Communication Sciences Universitas Islam Negeri Imam Bonjol Padang, Indonesia

²Departement of Islamic Theology Faculty of Etiquette and Humanities Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Morocco

³Department of Islamic Broadcasting Communication Faculty of Da'wah and Communication Sciences Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia

✉ sabiruddinphd@uinib.ac.id*

Abstract

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is a political da'wah organization that focuses on spreading Islamic ideology through scientific and intellectual approaches. This research aims to analyze the da'wah strategy, political ideas, and reasons for the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in the context of the spread of ideology through intellectual-based channels. *Tsaqofah* and evaluation of the strategic ideas proposed to realize their ideals. This research uses a qualitative method with a literature study approach, which is analyzed through three stages: data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion. The research results show that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia prefers a da'wah-based path *tsaqofah* (scientific) as its main basis, which is realized through seminars, discussions, and conferences to spread its ideas. With this approach, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is known as an intellectual movement that does not involve physical action like other radical organizations. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia also carries out two phases of organized struggle, namely (i) *Tafa'ul ma'al umma*, the phase of socializing ideas to the general public, and (ii) *Tafa'ul bil aam*, the phase of interaction of ideas in public space. Apart from that, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia proposed two strategic ideas to realize its ideals, namely (i) adopting the principle of moderation in Nahdlatul Ulama's preaching which various groups accept, and (ii) taking a step back to move forward by joining a political party as a first step to achieve long-term goals. This research provides insight into the da'wah strategy and dynamics of the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir political movement, as well as its relevance in Indonesia's social and political context.

Article Information:

Received September 17, 2023

Revised October 11, 2023

Accepted November 10, 2023

Keywords: *Metamorphosis, hizbut tahrir indonesia, politics*

INTRODUCTION

The arrival of the Islamic message to cleanse and illuminate human life with the light of its teachings (Mustaghfiroh, 2015). Islamic messages come to invite methods, systems, and philosophies that are different from the systems brought by previous humans. There are so many aspects of life that are explained in Islam,

How to cite:

Sabiruddin, S., Taqiyuddin, M. F., Ridwan, M., Sarwan, S., Mardiana, P. D. (2023). The Existence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Da'wah After Dissolution. *International Journal of Islamic Studies Higher Education*, 2(3). 223-239. <https://doi.org/10.24036/insight.v2i3.143>

E-ISSN:

2964-1861

Published by:

Islamic Studies and Development Center Universitas Negeri Padang

starting from economics, social fields, politics, culture, defense, security, and the basis of ideology and the state (Harapan, 2015; Haryanto et al., 2023). Including managing a government, Islam teaches. As a state ideology, Islam has made the state and its powers an inseparable part of the existence of Islam (Asrawijaya, 2022; Yandi et al., 2024). Islam has ordered the ummah to establish an Islamic state and government. Islam requires the government to manage based on Islamic laws (Ardiansyah, 2022; Arifiansyah et al., 2022; Iryani, 2017).

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is part of the network Hizbut Tahrir a political party as well as an Islamic movement that operates internationally in more than 40 countries (Zaki, 2015). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is one of the da'wah organizations in Indonesia that carries out da'wah activities within the framework of community organizations or mass organizations (Prasetyo et al., 2019; Setia & Rahman, 2021). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is an inseparable part of the International Hizbut Tahrir movement (Sabara, 2017). In historical records, Hizbut Tahrir was first founded in Al Quds Palestine by Taqiyuddin An-Nabbani. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has a special character that is different from other Islamic da'wah or harakah movements, namely political da'wah movements (Azzaro & Dewi, 2018; Rafiuddin, 2015; Rizki, 2018; Zainal, 2019). The Da'wah movement is a noble movement that can provide guidance show the dark path and become a beacon at night (Abdillah, 2018; Rahman, 2023).

As well as *Harakah Islamiyah*, or other Islamic missionary movements. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and its members are very enthusiastic about carrying out da'wah activities (Fuad, 2020). As Allah says in Surah Fushilat verse 33:

وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ قَوْلًا مِّمَّنْ دَعَا إِلَى اللَّهِ وَعَمِلَ صَالِحًا وَقَالَ إِنَّنِي مِنَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ ۝٣٣

Meaning: *Who has a better word than the person who calls to God, does good deeds, and says, "Indeed I am one of the Muslims (who surrender)" (Al-Quran Translation of the Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021).*

According to Bastomi, (2018), this verse explains to invite others to obey God and to obey Him with words, deeds, and in all their conditions and gestures, to do good and make Islam their religion and way of life. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's name alone shows that this is a political party (Azman, 2018). The liberation party, of course, has Islamic principles. In its home country and Indonesia, the Tahrir Party consciously chose not to join the existing government system so that it is more appropriately called a mass organization (Rizki, 2018). From history and genealogy, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia appears to be part of a transnational organization Hizbut Tahrir which was founded and developed in al-Quds Palestine in 1953 under the name *Hizb al-Tahrir*. History shows that before it was founded in Palestine, Hizbut Tahrir once attempted to apply to the Jordanian government through its interior ministry as a political party. However, this effort was rejected, and its existence in the country was even banned because it was an illegal organization (Khotimah, 2014; Muhammadin, 2016).

Background to its founding Hizbut Tahrir was influenced by the emergence of concerns about the decline of the Islamic ummah over a relatively long period. This has been seen since the 19th century AD when the strength of the Muslim Ummah was in decline and decline due to the hegemony of the Western world through its colonial mission. Hizbut Tahrir Seeing this failure, Islamic countries should have tried to save themselves, but instead of achieving

victory and glory, instead were increasingly in decline and helpless. The rationale for its fourth Hizbut Tahrir is to restore the success and life of Islam (Rafiuiddin, 2015). There is only one way according to Hizbut Tahrir by way of da'wah and jihad, and this can only be done with the establishment of an Islamic government based on the maroji' of consistent Islamic teachings, namely as-sunnah and al-Quran, in the form of upholding the Islamic khilafah (Azman, 2015; Bastomi, 2018).

Hizbut Tahrir was initiated by Taqiyudin al-Nabhani (Jamilah, 2015). Then after he died in 1977 M. leadership Hizbut Tahrir continued by Abdul-Qadim Zallum, an activist figure from Palestine. His leadership period lasted until 2003, then the leadership relay was continued by Atha' Abu Rashthah, a figure from Palestine who was previously a public relations officer. Hizbut Tahrir Jordan. It was appointed on April 13, 2003, by Dewa, and Mazhalim (Raouf, 2023). It is believed that Atha' Abu Rashthah took command of Hizbut Tahrir to date from The West Bank. He was accompanied by Khalid Hassan, a founder of the Fatah organization, a faction that is part of the Palestine Liberation Organization and a spiritual figure. Hizbut Tahrir namely Sheikh Assad Tamimi.

In principle, a person is enthusiastic about carrying out da'wah because he feels the benefits enjoyed by himself, his family, and others (Harista, 2018). However, the convenience of the activities carried out should not have the opposite effect on other parties. These other parties are individuals outside Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or other organizations and of course the government. The research and issues that the author raises in this research are (i) What are the thoughts of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia? (ii) What are the political thoughts of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and the reasons that made the Government disband it? (iii) What are the ideas and suggestions for realizing the wishes of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia?.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Several studies are considered relevant to this research. One of them is research conducted by Petersen et al., (2015), which discusses the ideas and ideas of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This research states that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia actively presents Islamic solutions coherently and systematically without further ado to overcome various problems of Muslims, especially in Indonesia (Ali & Orofino, 2018). Various human problems are explained clearly by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, where they offer answers based on Sharia and Khilafah solutions from their perspective, both from a scientific and religious perspective. However, regardless of the form and objectives promoted by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, this organization is considered to have the potential to threaten religious harmony in Indonesia (Aitkulova, 2021; Azman, 2015).

The relevance of this research is related to the explanation of the ideas and ideas of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia which was the reason the government disbanded the organization. According to Hayati, (2017), concept *Khilafah Islamiyah* which is promoted by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is a system of government for Muslims under one state leadership. *Khilafah Islamiyah* is considered a da'wah that must be fought for because through this system the application of Islamic laws can be realized perfectly (Taufiqurrohman & Prasetya, 2016). Meanwhile, according to Manik & Hasanuddin, (2017), in spreading its ideas, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia chose a da'wah route that focused

on *tsaqofah* (scientific) through seminars, discussions and con, and conferences. With this approach, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is known as an intellectual movement that does not use physical action like some other radical organizations (Aspinall et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the writings of Khoir, (2021); Syah & Setia, (2021) explain that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, in its manifesto, wants the establishment and formation of an Islamic state based on sharia. Sharia believe this goal, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is trying to recruit members and carry out infiltration (Rahman, 2023). After controlling power and strategic government posts, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia plans to uproot the established foundations of the state and replace them with the concept they aspire to. As a transnational organization, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, which is a branch of the international Hizbut Tahrir, develops religious understanding that transcends national boundaries (Arif, 2016).




Fig 1. Analysis VOSviewer Abstract and Title

Based on VOSviewer's analysis of the titles and abstracts of research articles discussing the thoughts of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia after its dissolution, it appears that this theme is not a new issue in Islamic studies. Research on this topic has been carried out from 2011 to 2020, with several indexed international studies in Scopus. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is a da'wah organization in Indonesia that carries out activities within the framework of community organizations.

Previous research discussed various aspects, such as Islamic community organizations developing in Indonesia, da'wah, Islamic movements, educational pathways as a method of preaching Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, fundamentalism in understanding the interpretation of the Quran, as well as the political and religious ideas of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Therefore, it can be concluded that studies on the thoughts of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia after its dissolution are still rarely carried out, or if they have been, not many have been indexed in Scopus.

METHODS

This research uses a qualitative research method with a literature study approach (Alshater et al., 2021; Giraldo et al., 2022; Han & Abdrahim, 2023).

Qualitative research is a method of collecting data in a natural setting to interpret phenomena that occur, where the researcher acts as a key instrument. Data source sampling was carried out using purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques (Alam, 2021; Muhammad, 2019; Wijaya, 2018; Winarno, 2023). Data collection techniques are carried out through triangulation (combination), data analysis is inductive or qualitative, and qualitative research results emphasize meaning rather than generalization (Ashour, 2018; Renz et al., 2018). The data collection technique in this research is library research or literature study, which is defined as "the study of books, literature, notes and reports that are relevant to the problem being studied". Therefore, the researcher collected reading sources related to the research topic and categorized them into two groups, namely primary and secondary sources. The reading sources that have been collected become data in this research which is then analyzed using techniques developed by Miles and Huberman (1992), which include three main stages: data reduction, data presentation, and drawing concluding data reduction stage, the researcher determines relevant data, simplifies it, compiles a general picture, and makes changes to data from written notes (Salmona & Kaczynski, 2024). Next, the researcher presents the data by compiling information that has the potential to support drawing conclusions and taking action. The final stage is drawing conclusions, where the researcher connects the information that has been compiled with the main problems, theoretical framework, and results of data analysis.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Emergence Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia, which became known as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, began with interactions between Kiyai Haji Abdullah bin Nuh, leader and owner of the Al-Ghazali Islamic Boarding School in Bogor, with Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi, an activist Hizbut Tahrir who lives in Australia. Kiyai Abdullah invited Abdurrahman to preach and live in Bogor around 1982-1983. Apart from actively preaching, Abdurrahman also teaches at Kiyai Abdullah's Islamic boarding school. He interacted a lot and exchanged ideas with student activists at the Al-Ghifari Mosque on the IPB University. This is where Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's activities in spreading the word began *Nasbrul Fikrah* (presentation of ideas and thoughts) Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani, founder of Hizbut Tahrir, through discussions among students.

During its development, scientific halaqahs began to be formed to discuss ideas Hizbut Tahrir contained in the works of Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. Young campus mosque activists quickly understood these ideas, supported by the enthusiasm of young people in responding to new things. Smart students, such as Muhammad Mustofa, son of Abdullah bin Nuh, have become activists of Hizbut Tahrir since studying in Jordan, he has helped spread ideas about Hizbut Tahrir. One of the da'wah strategies carried out is to establish a *Forum Silaturrahim Dakwah Kampus*. Da'wah institutions affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir began to spread to various well-known campuses in Indonesia, beyond the Bogor area.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's focus on students is based on two main reasons: students tend to quickly accept new ideas, and they have the potential to spread these da'wah ideas to their respective hometowns. Almost all state campuses on the island of Java have become targets for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's da'wah. In 1996, *Forum Silaturrahim Dakwah Kampus* throughout Indonesia was established,

which later became a forum to coordinate student *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* throughout Indonesia (Riyadhi et al., 2018; Saputra et al., 2020; Widiati, 2018).

Before the leadership of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia changed from Muhammad Al-Khattat to Hafidz Abdurrahman, the position of spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia had long been held by Ismail Yusanto. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia actively preaches to state campuses but has difficulty penetrating private campuses due to differences in student characteristics. Apart from having a management structure at the national level, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia also has management at the regional level, especially in big cities that have superior campuses. Uniquely, unlike the national level which has an official office, the regional management of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia does not have physical markers such as signs or nameplates. Activities at the regional level are more closed, with new member recruitment methods carried out via telecommunications networks or invitations to take part in scientific discussions (*liqo*) organized by members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Fahmi & Firmansyah, 2021; Ilyas, 2020).

On July 19 2017, the Indonesian government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights officially revoked the legal entity status of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. According to Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Wiranto, there were three main reasons for the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. First, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is considered not to have contributed positively to realizing national goals, even though it has a legal entity that should be subject to the positive laws of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the activities and views of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia are contrary to the principles of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, as regulated in the Law on Mass Organizations. Third, the activities of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia are considered to cause clashes in society that threaten security and order and endanger the integrity of the state.

Before its dissolution, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia was a transnational political and religious organization that grew rapidly after the collapse of the Soeharto regime. In the post-1998 reform period, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia showed significant growth by spreading to various cities in Indonesia, such as Jabodetabek, Bandung, Banten, Banjarmasin, Bima (NTB), Solo, Semarang, Sampang, Gorontalo, Tulungagung, Balikpapan, Lampung, Luwu (Sulawesi South), Palu, Purwokerto, Barabai (South Kalimantan), Medan, Mojokerto, Majalengka, Makassar, Ngawi, and other areas in East Java (Hasan, 2018). This list does not indicate that other regions do not have Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia activities but rather emphasizes that these regions are experiencing faster growth of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia than other regions.

Based on the da'wah activities of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia during 2011-2012, it can be seen that this organization carried out the phases of struggle in an organized manner, as depicted in the following illustration.




Fig 2. Organized phases of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's struggle

First phase, the *tafa'ul ma'al ummah* phase is the stage of socializing the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia to the general public, including government agencies. This strategy aims to attract sympathizers to join the movement. This effort is made to expand support and strengthen the member base of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia so that the activities carried out can have a greater impact on realizing the organization's ideals. The dissemination of ideas in this phase is focused on Islamic boarding schools and government institutions.

Second, the *tafa'ul bil aam* phase is where the ideas and members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia begin to interact in the public domain. In this phase, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia directed its preaching to mosques in big cities, especially those where educated congregations gathered (Azmi & Kandar, 2019; Luz & Stadler, 2019; Nur Isnaini et al., 2019). The media used include bulletins, tabloids, and magazines containing the ideas and thoughts of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, which are targeted at educated young people. Apart from that, this media is also a means of socializing various activities of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, such as *dauroh* recruitment and thematic seminars held regularly every month. This seminar raises topics that are relevant and subject to public discussion, to attract the attention of young people (Abd Razak, 2020; Saeed, 2015).

There are two more forms of activities as applications of this second phase, namely *balaqah* and *tabligh akbar*. The *balaqah* carried out by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia was a follow-up to the thematic seminar held. This thematic seminar was held in a limited room. The themes raised in this seminar are problems or topics that are currently crucial for public discussion. Usually, the seminar is attended by Muslim communities who have just interacted with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The seminar was led by senior Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia members as supervisors. This supervisor monitors and observes potential members who can be invited to join the *balaqah*. This *balaqah* will be a place for training new members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Enthusiastic about the continuation of the seminar discussion, *balaqah* was carried out (Engkizar et al., 2021; Kaputra et al., 2021). This *balaqah* is the smallest cell system owned by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This *balaqah* is led by one mentor with members consisting of five to twelve people. There is a separation between men and women. For men with male mentors, the same goes for women, very neat in management.

A massive da'wah activity is a demonstration which is an action of mobilizing all existing members of the *halaqah* (Aini & Don, 2022; Setiawan et al., 2021; Setiawati & Romli, 2023). The indicator of the success of the *halaqah* can be seen from this demonstration. For a good and productive *halaqah*, members of the *halaqah* are busy attending demonstrations, for *halaqahs* that are less solid, very few attend the demonstration. To see the success of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's da'wah, it can also be reflected in the number of people who attend the demonstrations (Tsien, 2016; Wiguna, 2021). If the topic of the demonstration is about the policy of increasing the price of fuel oil or increasing the basic tariff of electricity, corruption cases that do not go away and the problem of poverty that continues to increase, including the case of a slip of the tongue committed by Basuki Tjahya Purnama which led to accusations of blasphemy, to the case of conflicts occurring in Syria and Palestine, then Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia will mobilize its members to carry out demonstrations that criticize and condemn the Indonesian government which is considered to have carried out policies contrary to the interests of the people, Muslims, and Islam specifically. The rationale is that these problems are due to the adoption of a secular neoliberal economic and political system that is far removed from the values of Islam as taught in As-Sunah and the Quran. Therefore, the solution that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia always offers to solve these problems is the importance of establishing a *Khalifah islamiyah* state (Zulfadli, 2018).

The following is about the political thinking of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and the reasons for its dissolution (Costa, 2021; Muhammadin, 2016). In general, Hizbut Tahrir's political ideas and thoughts are different from the existing political mainstream ideas. The Islamic system of government is not a monarchy. In fact, Islam does not recognize the Monarchy system, nor anything similar to it. If it is a monarchy, the government applies the inheritance system (crown prince) so that the royal throne will be passed on to a crown prince, from his parents. Just as if they were passing on an inheritance. Whereas the Islamic system of government does not recognize the inheritance system. But the government will be held by a person who is sworn in by the people with full consent and freedom of choice.

Islamic government is not a republic system, which is based on the pillars of democracy, where sovereignty rests with the people. In this system, the people have the right to rule and make rules, including determining leaders, dismissing them, and drafting, amending or abolishing constitutions and laws. In contrast, in Islamic government, sovereignty is vested in the Shari'ah, not in the people. Islamic government is also not an imperial system (Irpan, 2022; Saada & Gross, 2017). The imperial system is very far from the teachings of Islam because it usually gives privileges to certain races or tribes in terms of governance. On the contrary, Islamic government, even though its territory consists of various races and tribes, still applies centralization based on sharia law that applies equally throughout the territory. The imperial system often gave preferential treatment to the central region in governance, finance and economics, which was different from the Islamic system. In Islamic governance, all regions are treated equally without racial or ethnic discrimination.

Islamic government also differs from federated systems, which divide territories into autonomous regions with their own local policies but remain united under a common government. Instead, Islamic government is a unitary

system that encompasses the entire country under one central authority. Examples can be seen in history, such as the Eastern regions of Morocco and Eastern Khurasan at the time of the *Khalifah*, which were known as *mudiriyatul Fuyum* (Districts) when the capital of Islam was in Cairo. In the Islamic system, the finances of the entire region are considered as a single entity, and expenditures are distributed based on the needs of the people, regardless of the region's income. If a region had a large income but little need, the excess would be allocated to other regions that needed more.

This Islamic system of government is called the *Khalifah*, which is defined as the general leadership of all Muslims in the world to enforce Islamic sharia law and spread Islamic propagation throughout the world (Abd Razak, 2020; Aslati et al., 2024). Another word for *Khalifah* is Imamate, which has a similar meaning. This form of government is expressed in shara' law as the structure of the Islamic state. Many authentic traditions mention these two terms with the same connotation, without any difference in meaning. In both the Quran and the Sunnah, the religious texts only mention these two terms without any indication of a difference in meaning. What is required is not the form of the word (*lafaz*) but its meaning as the basis of the system of government in accordance with the Shari'ah

Establishing a *khalifah* is obligatory for all Muslims around the world. While implementing it as implementing other obligations that have been made obligatory by Allah SWT for Muslims is a must, so that there is no more choice and relaxation in the framework of enforcing it. Ignoring its implementation is the greatest sin. Allah SWT will punish with a very painful punishment. Evidence about the appointment of the Caliph is mandatory for all Muslims in *As-sunnah* and *Ijma'* (Ciftci, 2019; Hasballah et al., 2021; Kusnadi, 2023). As for the Assunnah dalil, it is a proof narrated from Nafi' who said:

“Abdullah bin Umar once said to me: “I heard Rasulullah SAW say: Whoever removes his hands from obeying Allah will surely meet Allah on the Day of Resurrection without having any evidence.” Anyone who dies and does not have allegiance on his shoulders will die like the death of ignorance.”

There have been many statements circulating from Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia activists who oppose the state principles of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. They call Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution a system that must be abandoned, thereby causing unrest in society. This thinking reflects the way Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia understands Islam. According to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Islam is understood as a comprehensive ideology (*mabda'*) that covers all aspects of life, including politics and government. This understanding led Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's struggle movement to become predominantly political with the main goal always being related to state formation. The consequence of the view that Islam is not only a religion but also an ideology, is that there is mandatory harmony between public life and state activities within the corridors of Islamic ideology. Therefore, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia rejects all state policies that are not based on Islam (Agiyanto, 2018; Arqam et al., 2023; Rahman, 2023).

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia interprets ideology as a belief based on the ability of reason to understand certain teachings to determine the rules of life. In this context, faith based on rationality is understood as comprehensive thinking

about the universe, humans, life, and its relationship to life before and after the world. The rules originating from this creed are designed to provide solutions to various problems in human life, offer ways of resolving them, and ensure the maintenance and spread of this ideology.

From this understanding, it is clear how Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia equates the meaning of faith and ideology. *Aqidah* is interpreted as a comprehensive set of rules about life, which are understood rationally so that they can be applied in real life. This relationship between faith and rationality is a typical religious mindset in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia because they emphasize the key role of reason and thinking in Islamic practice (Saada & Gross, 2017). This view is born from the belief that Islam is a religion of thought, where reason is the main principle in understanding and implementing Islamic teachings.

In an effort to establish and re-establishing the *Khalifah* as a *thariqah* of implementing Islamic law, Hizbut Tahrir has several philosophical, normative and historical foundations (Shinkafi et al., 2017). The philosophical foundation is closely related to the framework of thought underlying Hizbut Tahrir's political vision, which aims to restore the *Khalifah* system. The normative foundation relates to the foundations of Islamic law derived from the sacred texts of the Quran and Hadith (Hazanah et al., 2023; Saifuddeen et al., 2014). Meanwhile, the historical foundation refers to the practice of the khalifah that has occurred in Islamic history, which provides an overview of the peak of the glory of the *Khalifah Islamiyah*, especially in the early days of Islam until the middle Ages. As mentioned earlier, the current government regime tends to be harsh and repressive towards Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and similar organizations. On the other hand, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia believes that their da'wah movement is a noble deed aimed at the good of the people (Khotimah, 2014; Muhammadiyah, 2016). To realize their goals without having to deal directly with repressive governments, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia develops two main strategies:

The first strategy is to adopt the principles of the da'wah movement carried out by Nahdlatul Ulama. Has a strategic position because of its closeness to the government, which makes it part of official government circles. Nahdlatul Ulama's support for President Jokowi's government since the beginning of his leadership has provided significant benefits for his da'wah movement. This position allows Nahdlatul Ulama to access policies that support its da'wah activities (Rafiuddin, 2015; Setiawan, 2018). Apart from that, the principles of Nahdlatul Ulama's da'wah are moderate, such as *at-Tawassut* (middle), *at-Tasammub* (tolerance), and *at-Tawazun* (balance), accepted by various groups, including the government, law enforcement officials and Indonesian society in general. These principles enable Nahdlatul Ulama to combine religious and cultural aspects so that its da'wah activities can be well received by the wider community (Mufid, 2020).

The second strategy is taking a step back to move forward optimally by joining an existing political party. This strategy has been implemented by several political parties in Indonesian history. It is said to "take a step back" because this step does not directly target large systems, but starts from a smaller scope. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia does not have experience in managing small structures such as cities or districts, so it will be difficult to directly manage a country with high complexity, let alone the *Khalifah* which has a much wider scope (Hafizah et al., 2024). Managing a city or district can be considered an initial step or a trial

run before taking on a larger role in the management of a more complex country (Fuad, 2020; Vergeer et al., 2013; Waldi et al., 2018).

CONCLUSION

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia its distribution focuses more on da'wah-based *tsaqofah* (scientific) through seminars, discussions, and conferences, so that it is known as an intellectual movement without using physical action like other radical organizations. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's da'wah strategy is carried out in an organized manner in two stages of struggle, namely Phase *Tafa'ul ma'al ummah* which focuses on disseminating ideas to the general public, and Phase Table of Contents which emphasizes the interaction of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's ideas in the public space. To realize its ideals, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia proposes two strategic approaches: first, adopting the principles of the Nahdlatul Ulama da'wah movement which is moderate and accepted by various groups; and second, taking a step back by joining an existing political party as a first step to gradually achieving their big goals

REFERENCES

- Abd Razak, A. H. (2020). Multiple Sharia' board directorship: a Maslahah (public interest) perspective. *Journal of Islamic Marketing*, 11(3), 745–764. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIMA-10-2018-0185>
- Abdillah, M. Z. (2018). Pengaruh Dakwah Jamaah Tabligh Terhadap Pembangunan Masyarakat Muslim di Lombok Sejak Tahun 2011-2016. *Al-I'lam: Jurnal Komunikasi Dan Penyiaran Islam*, 1(2), 01. <https://doi.org/10.31764/jail.v1i2.227>
- Agiyanto, U. (2018). Law Enforcement in Indonesia: Exploration of the Concept of Justice in Islamic Dimension with Pancasila Ideology. *AL-HAYAT: Journal of Islamic Education*, 2(2), 246. <https://doi.org/10.35723/ajie.v2i2.37>
- Aini, D. Z., & Don, D. A. G. (2022). The Implementation of Communication Skills in Da 'Wah. *Hamdard Islamicus*, 45(1). <https://doi.org/10.57144/hi.v45i1.276>
- Aitkulova, M. (2021). Hizb ut-Tahrir: Dreaming of Caliphate. In M. A. Upal & C. M. Cusack (Eds.), *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements* (Vol. 21, pp. 402–420). BRILL. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004435544_022
- Alam, M. K. (2021). A systematic qualitative case study: questions, data collection, NVivo analysis and saturation. *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 16(1), 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QROM-09-2019-1825>
- Ali, J. A., & Orofino, E. (2018). Islamic Revivalist Movements in the Modern World. *Journal for the Academic Study of Religion*, 31(1), 27–54. <https://doi.org/10.1558/jasr.35051>
- Alshater, M. M., Saad, R. A. J., Abd. Wahab, N., & Saba, I. (2021). What do we know about zakat literature? A bibliometric review. *Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research*, 12(4), 544–563. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIABR-07-2020-0208>
- Ardiansyah, A. (2022). Islam Universal dan Politik dalam Pandangan Nurcholish Madjid. In *Prodi S2 Studi Agama-Agama Uin Sunan ...* (p. 48). [Google Scholar](#)

- Arif, S. (2016). Kontradiksi Pandangan HTI atas Pancasila. *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*, 2(1), 19–34. <https://doi.org/10.31599/jkn.v2i1.36>
- Arifiansyah, F., Kinanti, R. A., & Fitriyah, D. B. (2022). Pengelolaan Keuangan Publik Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Islam. *IQTISADIE: Journal of Islamic Banking and Shari'ah Economy*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.36781/iqtisadie.v2i1.219>
- Arqam, M. L., Suwarno, R. W., & Shalihin, R. R. (2023). Perception Index of Muhammadiyah Ideology: A Survey on Al-Islam and Kemuhammadiyah Values and Understandings. *Al-Hayat: Journal of Islamic Education*, 7(2), 401. <https://doi.org/10.35723/ajie.v7i2.403>
- Ashour, M. L. (2018). Triangulation As a Powerful Methodological Research Technique in Technology-Based Services. *Business & Management Studies: An International Journal*, 6(1), 193–208. <https://doi.org/10.15295/bmij.v6i1.209>
- Aslati, Agustar, A., Silawati, Arisman, & Arafah, S. (2024). Utilizing Science and Maqasid al-Shariah in Resolving Contemporary Issues of Islamic Family Law. In *Al-Manabij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam* (Vol. 18, Issue 1). Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam. <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v18i1.10571>
- Aspinall, E., Fossati, D., Muhtadi, B., & Warburton, E. (2020). Elites, masses, and democratic decline in Indonesia. *Democratization*, 27(4), 505–526. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1680971>
- Asrawijaya, E. (2022). Harmonization Between Customs and Islam in the Jalawastu Community. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 16(2), 378–398. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2022.16.2.378-398>
- Azman, A. (2015). Jihad Perspektif Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. *Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Pidana Dan Ketatanegaraan*, 4(1), 230–238. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24252/ad.v4i1.1498>
- Azman, A. (2018). Gerakan Dan Pemikiran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. *Al Daulah : Jurnal Hukum Pidana Dan Ketatanegaraan*, 7(1), 99–113. <https://doi.org/10.24252/ad.v7i1.5329>
- Azmi, N. A., & Kandar, M. Z. (2019). Factors contributing in the design of environmentally sustainable mosques. *Journal of Building Engineering*, 23, 27–37. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobe.2019.01.024>
- Azzaro, M. N., & Dewi, P. A. R. (2018). Analisis Framing Pemberitaan Kasus Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Di Kompas. com, Tempo. co, dan Republika. co. id. *Commercium*, 1(1), 18–21. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26740/tc.v1i1.25445>
- Bastomi, H. (2018). Keteladanan Sebagai Dakwah Kontemporer dalam Menyongsong Masyarakat Modern. *KOMUNIKA: Jurnal Dakwah Dan Komunikasi*, 11(1), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.24090/kom.v11i1.1275>
- Ciftci, S. (2019). Islam, Social Justice, and Democracy. *Politics and Religion*, 12(4), 549–576. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000810>
- Costa, C. G. F. (2021). Disaster management and climate adaptation roadmap for coastal cities based on undrr's ten essentials. *Journal of Integrated Coastal Zone Management*, 21(1), 33–53. <https://doi.org/10.5894/RGCI-N372>
- Engkizar, E., K, M., Kaputra, S., Arifin, Z., Syafril, S., Anwar, F., & Mutathahirin, M. (2021). Building of Family-based Islamic Character for Children in Tablighi Jamaat Community. *Ta'dib*, 24(2), 299. <https://doi.org/10.31958/jt.v24i2.4847>
- Fahmi, F., & Firmansyah, F. (2021). Orientasi Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam

- Pasca Proklamasi Indonesia. *Al-Liqo: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 6(1), 83–95. <https://doi.org/10.46963/alliqo.v6i1.262>
- Fuad, A. F. N. (2020). Da'wa and politics: lived experiences of the female Islamists in Indonesia. *Contemporary Islam*, 14(1), 19–47. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-019-00442-x>
- Giraldo, M. C. B., Toro, O. N. P., Arias, A. V., Arias, M. L. B., & Piedrahita, L. B. (2022). Research trends of the knowledge-based economy: A bibliometric study. *Intangible Capital*, 18(2), 290–313. <https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.2048>
- Hafizah, T., Amrullah, A., & Fakhrudin, F. (2024). Pendidikan Tasawuf Falsafi sebagai Landasan Etika dalam Pendidikan Islam. *Indonesian Journal of Innovation Multidisipliner Research*, 2(4), 44–50. <https://doi.org/10.31004/ijim.v2i4.100>
- Han, W., & Abdrahim, N. A. (2023). The role of teachers' creativity in higher education: A systematic literature review and guidance for future research. *Thinking Skills and Creativity*, 48. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2023.101302>
- Harapan, R. Z. (2015). Etika Islam Dalam Mengelola Lingkungan Hidup. *EduTech: Jurnal Ilmu Pendidikan Dan Ilmu Sosial*, 1(1), 1–13. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.30596/edutech.v1i01.271>
- Harista, E. (2018). Penggunaan Bahasa Persuasi di Media Sosial dalam Berdakwah pada Akun Facebook 'Yusuf Mansur (Official)'. *Mawa'izh: Jurnal Dakwah Dan Pengembangan Sosial Kemanusiaan*, 8(2), 308–324. <https://doi.org/10.32923/maw.v8i2.778>
- Haryanto, S., Rizki, S., & Fahdilah, M. (2023). Konsep SQ: Kecerdasan Spiritual Menurut Danah Zohar Dan Ian Marshal Dan Relevansinya Terhadap Tujuan Pembelajaran PAI. *PARAMUROBI: JURNAL PENDIDIKAN AGAMA ISLAM*, 6(1), 197–212. <https://doi.org/10.32699/paramurobi.v6i1.4853>
- Hasballah, K., Darna, A., Said, W., Akbar, H., Makinara, I. K., & Fauzan, F. (2021). Identifying 'Illat through Munasabah in Islamic Law: A Perspective of Imam Al-Ghazali. *Samarah*, 5(2), 598–618. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v5i2.10914>
- Hayati, N. (2017). Konsep Khilafah Islamiyyah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Kajian Living al-Quran Perspektif Komunikasi. *Epistemé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman*, 12(1), 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2017.12.1.169-200>
- Hazanah, N., Netti, M., & Aryanti, Y. (2023). Analytical Study of the Development of Islamic Law in Indonesia. *Jurnal Elyakhshi*, 1(1), 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.69637/jelsy.v1i1.6>
- Ilyas, M. (2020). Metode Muraja'ah dalam Menjaga Hafalan Al-Quran. *AL-LIQQO: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 5(01), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.46963/alliqo.v5i01.140>
- Irpan, I. (2022). The Objectives of Islamic Education In The Perspective of The Tabligh Congregation In Indonesia. *Edukasi Islami: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 11(02). <https://doi.org/10.30868/ei.v11i02.3200>
- Iryani, E. (2017). Hukum Islam, Demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia. *Jurnal Ilmiah Universitas Batanghari Jambi*, 17(2), 24–31. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.33087/jiubj.v17i2.357>
- Jamilah, S. (2015). Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir di Kota Pare-Pare (Membaca Pengaruh Pemikiran Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. *Jurnal Diskursus Islam*, 3(1), 1–

19. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24252/jdi.v3i1.192>
- Kaputra, S., Engkizar, E., Akyuni, Q., Rahawarin, Y., & Safarudin, R. (2021). Dampak Pendidikan Orang Tua Terhadap Kebiasaan Religius Anak Dalam Keluarga Jama'ah Tabligh. *Al-Tadzkiyyah: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 12(2), 249–268. <https://doi.org/10.24042/atjpi.v12i2.9979>
- Khoir, A. B. (2021). Radikalisme dan Aparatur Sipil Negara: Faktor Penyebab dan Upaya Pemerintah Menangani Radikalisme pada Aparatur Sipil Negara. *Kebijakan: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi*, 12(2), 145–162. <https://doi.org/10.23969/kebijakan.v12i2.3938>
- Khotimah, K. (2014). Hizbut Tahrir Sebagai Gerakan Sosial (Melihat Konsep HT mengenai Negara). *ESENSIA: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin*, 15(1), 59–88. <https://doi.org/10.14421/esensia.v15i1.764>
- Kusnadi, K. (2023). Relevansi Pemikiran Hukum Imam Malik Dengan Konteks Indonesia Tentang Pernikahan Beda Agama. *Ulumul Syari: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Hukum Dan Syariah*, 12(1), 14–26. <https://doi.org/10.52051/ulumulyari.v12i1.195>
- Luz, N., & Stadler, N. (2019). Religious urban decolonization: New mosques/antique cities. *Settler Colonial Studies*, 9(2), 284–300. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2017.1409406>
- Manik, E. S., & Hasanuddin, H. (2017). Strategi Membangun Kesadaran Penerapan Syari'ah Islam melalui Dakwah Ekstraparlementer. *Al-Fikra: Jurnal Ilmiah Keislaman*, 16(2), 233. <https://doi.org/10.24014/af.v16i2.4245>
- Mufid, M. (2020). Green Fatwas in Bahtsul Masail: Nahdlatul Ulama's Response to the Discourse of Environmental Crisis in Indonesia. *Al-Ihkam: Jurnal Hukum Dan Pranata Sosial*, 15(2), 173–200. <https://doi.org/10.19105/al-lhkam.v15i2.3956>
- Muhammad, D. H. (2019). Upaya Peningkatan Baca Tulis Al-Quran Melalui Metode Qiroati. *JIE (Journal of Islamic Education)*, 3(2), 142. <https://doi.org/10.29062/jie.v3i2.97>
- Muhammadin, M. (2016). Relevansi Sistem Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Dengan Sistem Negara Islam Modern. *Intizar*, 22(2), 365. <https://doi.org/10.19109/intizar.v22i2.949>
- Mustaghfiroh, H. (2015). Rekonstruksi Filsafat Pendidikan Islam (Mengembalikan Tujuan Pendidikan Islam Berbasis Tujuan Penciptaan dan Tujuan Risalah). *Edukasia: Jurnal Penelitian Pendidikan Islam*, 10(1). <https://doi.org/10.21043/edukasia.v10i1.786>
- Nur Isnaini, U. K., Nyimasmukti, B. R., Rahawarin, Y., & Asrida, A. (2019). Revitalizing the Mosques Function as a Means of Forming Muslim Scholars and Students in Indonesia. *Khalifa: Journal of Islamic Education*, 3(2), 142. <https://doi.org/10.24036/kjie.v3i2.29>
- Petersen, K., Vakkalanka, S., & Kuzniarz, L. (2015). Guidelines for conducting systematic mapping studies in software engineering: An update. *Information and Software Technology*, 64, 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2015.03.007>
- Prasetyo, B., Sunan, U., & Surabaya, A. (2019). Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia dalam Perspektif Sosial Politik Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia dalam Perspektif Sosial Politik. *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 19(2), 251–264. <https://dx.doi.org/10.24042/ajsk.v19i2.3371>

- Rafiuddin, M. (2015). Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir (Studi Analisis Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir vis a vis NU). *Islamuna: Jurnal Studi Islam*, 2(1), 29–55. <https://doi.org/10.19105/islamuna.v2i1.653>
- Rahman, M. T. (2023). Post-Prohibition Da'wah of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia and Islamic Defenders Front. *Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies*, 17(1), 79–100. <https://doi.org/10.15575/idaajhs.v17i1.24201>
- Raouf, M. E. (2023). Testimony: The return of the Taliban: Education in danger in contemporary Afghanistan. *Geographies of Globalized Education Privatization: International Perspectives*, 205–214. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37853-9_11
- Renz, S. M., Carrington, J. M., & Badger, T. A. (2018). Two Strategies for Qualitative Content Analysis: An Intramethod Approach to Triangulation. *Qualitative Health Research*, 28(5), 824–831. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732317753586>
- Riyadhi, B., Zulfikar, Z., Sauri, S., & Ruyadi, Y. (2018). Students Entrepreneurial Character Building: Through Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK). *Annual Civic Education Conference (ACEC 2018)*, 476–479. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2991/acec-18.2018.109>
- Rizki, M. F. (2018). Deradikalisasi Pengikut Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Pasca Terbitnya Perppu No.2 Tahun 2017 Tentang Ormas. *Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana*, 3(1), 164. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.35706/jpi.v3i1.1420>
- Saada, N., & Gross, Z. (2017). Islamic education and the challenge of democratic citizenship: a critical perspective. *Discourse*, 38(6), 807–822. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01596306.2016.1191011>
- Sabara. (2017). Hizbut-Tahrir in Da'wah and Islamic political movements in Indonesia. *Jisca*, 6(2), 271–294. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24252/jicsa.v6i2.4315>
- Saeed, H. (2015). Empowering Unheard Voices through “Theatre of the Oppressed”: Reflections on the Legislative Theatre Project for Women in Afghanistan - Notes from the Field. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 7(2), 299–326. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huu028>
- Saifuddeen, S. M., Rahman, N. N. A., Isa, N. M., & Baharuddin, A. (2014). Maqasid al-Shariah as a Complementary Framework to Conventional Bioethics. *Science and Engineering Ethics*, 20(2), 317–327. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9457-0>
- Salmona, M., & Kaczynski, D. (2024). Qualitative data analysis strategies. In *How to conduct qualitative research in finance* (pp. 80-96). Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803927008.00012>
- Saputra, I., Ritonga, F. A., Sikumbang, A. T., & Zainun, Z. (2020). Membentuk Kepribadian Islam melalui Strategi Komunikasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) di STMIK Budi Darma Medan. *KOMUNIKA: Jurnal Dakwah Dan Komunikasi*, 14(1), 125–138. <https://doi.org/10.24090/komunika.v14i1.3644>
- Setia, P., & Rahman, M. T. (2021). Kekhilafahan Islam, Globalisasi dan Gerilya Maya: Studi Kasus Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. *FIKRAH*, 9(2), 241. <https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v9i2.11603>
- Setiawan, A. H., Nasor, M., Ghazali, B., Mukmin, H., Hidayatullah, K., Wijaya, M. R., & Khoirurroji'in. (2021). Curative Da'wah and the Implication

- Towards the Changes of Convict Religious Conduct in Penitentiary Class I Bandar Lampung. *Proceedings of the 1st UMGESHIC International Seminar on Health, Social Science and Humanities (UMGESHIC-ISHSSH 2020)*, 585. <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211020.078>
- Setiawan, Z. (2018). Relasi Penerimaan Pa Ncasila Oleh Ormas K Eagamaan Terhadap Pengokohan Nasionalisme Dan Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama (Studi Kasus Nahdlatul Ulama dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). *Sosio Dialektika*, 2(2). <https://doi.org/10.31942/sd.v2i2.2093>
- Setiawati, R., & Romli, K. (2023). Da'wah Communication in Forming Children's Character at LPKA Class II Bandar Lampung. *West Science Law and Human Rights*, 1(03), 133–140. <https://doi.org/10.58812/wslhr.v1i03.144>
- Shinkafi, A. A., Ali, N. A., & Choudhury, M. (2017). Contemporary Islamic economic studies on Maqasid Shari'ah: a systematic literature review. *Humanomics*, 33(3), 315–334. <https://doi.org/10.1108/H-03-2017-0041>
- Syah, M. K. T., & Setia, P. (2021). Radikalisme Islam: Telaah Kampanye Khilafah oleh Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Pra-Pembubaran oleh Pemerintah. *Jurnal Iman Dan Spiritualitas*, 1(4), 523–535. <https://doi.org/10.15575/jis.v1i4.14094>
- Taufiqurrohman, M., & Prasetya, A. P. (2016). A Rising Indonesian Jihadist Plotter: Bahrn Naim. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8(11), 8–10. <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351466>
- Tsien, J. Z. (2016). Principles of intelligence: On evolutionary logic of the brain. *Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience*, 9 (FEB2016), 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2015.00186>
- Vergeer, M., Hermans, L., & Sams, S. (2013). Online social networks and micro-blogging in political campaigning: The exploration of a new campaign tool and a new campaign style. *Party Politics*, 19(3), 477–501. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068811407580>
- Waldi, A., Miyato, M., Montessori, M., Nazirwan, N., Ibrahim, R., & Sabiruddin, S. (2018). The Strategy of Political Parties in Wining Legislative Elections in Indonesia: Studies in Dharmasraya District. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research of Higher Education*, 1(1), 18–31. <https://doi.org/10.24036/ijmurhica.v1i1.7>
- Widiati, H. (2018). Strategi Dakwah Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) dalam Meningkatkan Religiusitas Mahasiswa (Studi pada LDK Babussalam Untirta Serang Banten). *AdZikra: Jurnal Komunikasi & Penyiaran Islam*, 10(1), 50–76. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.32678/adzikra.v10i1.3799>
- Wiguna, I. B. A. A. (2021). Pelatihan Dan Pengembangan Keterampilan Mengajar Guru Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini. *SELAPARANG Jurnal Pengabdian Masyarakat Berkemajuan*, 4(3), 533. <https://doi.org/10.31764/jpmb.v4i3.4798>
- Wijaya, H. (2018). Analisis Data Kualitatif Model Spradley (Etnografi). In *Research Gate* (Issue March, pp. 1–9). <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323557072>
- Winarno, Y. (2023). Penerapan Metode Snowball Throwing pada Mata Pelajaran Ekonomi dalam Upaya Peningkatkan Aktivitas dan Hasil Belajar Ekonomi Kelas XI IPS di SMA Negeri 1 Hulu Sungai Kabupaten Ketapang Provinsi Kalimantan Barat. *Jurnal Penelitian Inovatif*, 3(1), 165–188.

<https://doi.org/10.54082/jupin.143>

Yandi, A., Ediz, M. H., & Roszi, J. P. (2024). Analysis of Religious Court Decisions Regarding Heir Rights for Non-Muslims. *Jurnal Elyakhsbi*, 1(1), 14–24. <https://doi.org/10.69637/jelsy.v1i1.17>

Zainal, A. Z. M. (2019). Hadis Ideologi Perspektif Hizbut Tahrir. *Al-Bukhari: Jurnal Ilmu Hadis*, 2(2), 109–125. <https://doi.org/10.32505/v2i2.1158>

Zaki, I. (2015). Pemikiran Ekonomi Politik Internasional Hizbut Tahrir. *JRP (Jurnal Review Politik)*, 3(2), 190–213. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15642/jrp.2013.3.2.190-213>

Zulfadli, Z. (2018). Orientasi Politik Aktivistis Eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Pasca Dibubarkan. *Kontekstualita*, 33(02), 169–189. <https://doi.org/10.30631/kontekstualita.v35i02.133>

Copyright holder:

© Sabiruddin, S., Taqiyuddin, M. F., Ridwan, M., Sarwan, S., Mardiana, P. D. (2023)

First publication right:

International Journal of Islamic Studies Higher Education

This article is licensed under:

CC-BY-SA